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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze  some fundamental impacts of the process of informatization. In
particular, we address socio-economic and spatial impacts and discuss possible consequences
for policy. Our objective is to discuss issues concerning the desirability, necessity and possibil-
ity of government responses to the process of informatization. After a general introduction, we
turn to a more detailed discussion of three highly relevant areas for policy: market structures,
urban networks and media use. Finally we discuss the options for policy, as well as the need to
regulate the informatization process
Corresponding address:
Free University Amsterdam
Faculty of Economics and Econometrics
de Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
The Netherlands
phone:+31 204446093
fax: +3  1 20 4446004
email: houwersloot@econ.vu.nl
1. Introduction
Nowadays it is generally accepted that we live in an information era, at least as far as Western
societies are concerned. We should not forget however, that ‘eras’ usually last several decades,
and the information era has only just begun. So it seems more appropriate to speak of the
transitional phase between the industrial and the information age. Apart from this semantic
argument, there are other reasons to buttress the thesis that the information era has not yet
manifested itself in full detail. For example, the current rate of technological developments,
which are highly dynamic and unpredictable, lead to continuous innovations that are developed
and exploited. There is ample opportunity for speculation, which inevitably lead to such
visionary predicaments as the ‘global village’, ‘the wired society’ or ‘the paperless society’.
Solid scientific research however, seems limited because of the sparse number of empirical
facts and figures.
As with the beginning of almost every era, the most important driving force is a newly
developed technology. Such technological developments stand in mutual relationship to
societal developments and have an impact upon each other. Usually however, the impacts on
society are felt for a much longer period, and not seldom influence the fimdamental
characteristics of a society. The invention of the steam engine for example, in the first place
triggered the industrial revolution. The technology caused this revolution, but meanwhile,
rising wages had paved the way for the successtil  application of the steam engine. Clearly, the
steam engine had an impact on society for a much longer period than the end of the nineteenth
century. One may argue that this influence stretches as far as the 1950s.
This paper addresses the policy issues evolving from the process of informatization (which will
be defined in the next section). Policy is, to a significant extent, a reaction to societal trends
and developments, which in their turn are largely influenced by technological developments.
Since technological progress and the impacts on society are highly uncertain, it is apparent that
an analysis of policy in reaction to these development leads to a great amount of uncertainty.
We therefore maintain this discussion on a general level and look for underlying themes rather
than topics. Our goal is to study the possible impacts of informatization on a number of areas
relevant for policy-making, and discuss the potential implications, given a generalized set of
policy targets. In particular, we consider the policy target of an efficiently-working economy
with a minimal disturbance from policy intervention. In other words, we discuss whether the
informatization trend gives additional impetus for the public authorities to withdraw from the
economic playing field.
As described above, the topic is clearly too broad and too general to apprehend in the context
of one paper. Therefore, we restrict ourselves in two important ways. First, we use the concept
of informatization only in relation to economic transactions. In this specific context, we define
informatization as the increasing share of the value of tradedproducts or services that is
comprised of non-material - intangible - attributes of these tradeables. It is important to note
that informatization in this sense can occur in two distinct ways. One is that  this increase of
value may be due to uniqu  products, which is related to the process of cultural identification.
Young people in particular seem to be very sensitive to this type of informatization. Wearing
Nikes or Reeboks gives one a certain level of esteem which has absolutely nothing to do with
the inherent quality of the shoes. Secondly, informatization may be a real process, in the sense
that the product, service, or its use actually increases in quality, for example, because of
improved utility, reliability or durability. For instance, research that has led to better designs
leading to more comfortable or stylish shoes is - from one vantage point- a real effect of
informatization.
A second restriction that we adopt in this paper is our exclusive concentration on
consequences that can be expected in the economic domain. In particular, when we move to a
discussion of policy consequences, we address topics relative to the functioning of economic
processes. Although the context of this paper is mainly Western European, the issues discussed
have a broader validity.
This brings us to the following organization of the paper. In the next section we give a
summary overview of the process of informatization and discuss a number of closely related
issues. This overview is not complete, but it does highlight arguments which are important to
our discussion. This has the inevitable danger of subjectivity, but we have tried to keep the
discussion balanced. In Sections 3 to 5 we treat in greater detail the potential - theoretical -
effects of the informatization trend on three dedicated areas which carry significant policy
relevance. These areas are the market structure, urban networks and media usage. In Section 6
we turn to the role of governments. The relation between policy and the process of informat-
ization is bi-directional and we treat both directions. So in this section, we first discuss the
policy alternatives of the government in relation to information networks which are of basic
importance to the emergence of the information era. Secondly, we discuss the impact of
informatization on the role and legitimacy of government intervention in the economic process.
Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. A bird’s eye view on informatization
Each transaction in economics - each good or service that is traded - consists of a material,
tangible component and an immaterial, intangible component. For example, a bunch of wheat
has a certain value. From merely observing the wheat, experts may infer whether it is okay,
what type it is etc. These information components are directly and inseparably related to the
material component. There are, however, a number of other aspects of the bunch of wheat that
cannot be inferred from the material part of the wheat itself such as its origin, the time it has
been stored, its treatment during transport, etc. These attributes may well define a significant
share of the value of the good.
Informatization was defined earlier as a process of change in which the information component
in the transactions of an economy becomes increasingly important. There are two contributing
phenomena to the process of informatization and both are strongly related to developments in
information technology. In the first place, the cost of information provision has fallen
enormously. There is much more information available at much less cost than ever before. At
the same time, the possibilities for effectively dealing with this information are also growing at
enormous rates. Increasing levels of education, combined with powerful technology to handle
information and make meaningful inferences from detailed information, ,give rise to this
possibility to treat larger amounts of information. When we elaborate on the wheat example
above, it may be useful for the consumer to know which farmer produced the wheat, because
he can consult a data bank to inquire about the conditions of the farmer’s land.
The second contributing phenomenon to the
process of informatization is the increase in the
share of tradeables that have a large
information component. This is illustrated in
Figure 1, which shows the relative share in
per capita consumption in the Netherlands
over the period 19251992, in three
categories: basic needs, industrial products
and services. The figure shows that per
capita consumption of services has grown
significantly over the period 1960-  1992,
while the per capita consumption of the
other two categories remained more or less 2s 35 45 5s 65 75 85 I
constant. Although products with a large
information component are not identical to Figure 1 Composition of per capita consumption in the
services, and services are not by definition Netherlands, 1925- 1992..Source,  CBS, (1994).
products with a large information
component, it is nevertheless not unreasonable to assume a high correlation between the
information component and the service character of a tradeable. Therefore, this figure does not
prove the notion that the relative consumption of consumables with a large information
component has grown importantly, but gives a strong illustration of the point.
Figure 1 also suggests an important point about the consumption of basic needs and industrial
goods. The per capita consumption of these categories grew steadily over the period 1925
1960 (approximately), and remained on a more or less constant level afterwards. This not only
implies that the overall growth in per capita consumption is entirely attributable to the growth
in services but it also suggests that this growth has not led to a decrease in absolute per capita
consumption of tangible goods. The message is that informatization is a complement rather
than a substitute for tangible products. Consequently, the growth in information consumption
does not necessarily lead to a reduction in the consumption oftangible goods. We repeat
however, that Figure 1 can only be interpreted as an illustration of the phenomena we suspect
will happen. So the above remarks should be read as testable hypotheses, rather than well
established conclusions.
The process of informatization can be
captured economically in a simple
diagrammatic presentation, (see Figure 2).
In this figure, the (hypothetical) market for
information is sketched. In the “old”
situation, the demand curve for information
was DD, while the supply curve was SS.
Equilibrium was reached at a quantity of Qold
D’ for a price Pold.  Obviously this is a
Q o l d a, Q
theoretical, abstract market and Q,,,,,  and P,,
are unobservable, imaginary variables. As
described above, technological progress has
led to an autonomous increase in both the
Figure 2 The hypothetical  market  for  information with an
exogenous shift  in  supply and demand.
demand and the supply of information. This
means that for the same prices larger quantities of information are demanded and supplied. In
the diagram this implies a shift of both curves to the right. As a result of technological
progress, the “new” demand curve becomes D’D’ (for example), while the “new” supply curve
becomes S’S’ (for example). In the presentation of the diagram the new quantity is Q,,  which
is clearly larger than Qold. This increase is the process of informatization. The new price is P,,,.
In this diagram P,, is less than the old price Pold, but it is clear that a similar diagram could be
drawn for which P,,,  exceeds P,,.  The price increase or decrease depends on the size of the
shifts of the two curves. Unequivocally however, the new quantity Q,,  is larger than Q,,,,+
When we take a closer look at the price of information, we observe that it consists of two
parts. As with most goods and services, these elements are the production costs and the
transportation costs. The interesting thing now is that concerning the product information,
technological progress has an effect on both elements, but this impact is much more significant
for the transportation costs. Production costs are also influenced, for example, because sources
required to generate information are more easily accessible, but this may be set against the
increased costs of manipulating the inputs. As far as production is concerned, the picture is
unclear. In transportation, however, it is evident that the new technologies have
unambiguously led to a decrease in costs, and thus in a decrease in the per unit costs of
information. This not only holds for the product information, but also for the information
component associated with other products.
The fact that the reduction in costs is mainly attributable to the decrease in transportation costs
has significant implications for the organization of production. To develop this point, we refer
to the theory of Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) originally developed by Williamson
(1979). Although TCE is not without its critics (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996) which may be
justifiable particularly when TCE is analyzed in its fundamentals, some important conclusions
of TCE stand firmly because of their conceptual strength and their empirical relevance. In
particular, TCE explains the mere existence of firms (organizations in general) as a means of
exerting control over the constituant  elements of the production process and to reduce the
transaction costs. The basic idea is that the production of a good involves the input of a very
large number of individual basic goods and actions by people. By organizing these actions into
one unit (the firm), the costs associated with the control of the process and the transactions
involved are minimized. Therefore, firms are an efficient way to organize production.
This minimal excerpt from traditional TCE suffices for our purposes. The point is that costs of
control and transactions are, to a significant extent, related to information. The particular
aspect of control - which pertains to quality standards, delivery times etc. - is to a very large
degree a matter of information. But transactions also involve information, as, for example, the
bills and other accompanying documents concerns nothing but information.
As a result, these transaction costs, and consequently the cost of information, is an important
driving force for the existence and scale of firms. Basically, such transaction costs are a
decreasing function of firm size, so to minimize these costs creates an incentive to build large
organizations.
In modem versions of TCE, other types of transaction costs also play a role. Gurbaxani and
Whang (1991) noted that although the firm may be a coordinating device for minimizing
external transaction costs, still other costs within the firm, which are also related to the
acquisition of information, labeled internal transaction costs, are relevant. Gurbaxani and
Whang in particular, identify agency costs - “costs related to obtaining information on the
agents’ behavior” op cit. p. 63, where agents are defined as the various units that make up a
firm - and decision-information cost. Both costs components increase with firm size.
Informatization impacts on both external and internal transaction costs. Decreasing external
transaction costs forms an incentive for the disintegration of firms; decreasing internal
transaction costs works in the opposite direction. The result is unclear, but two further remarks
are noteworthy.
The first is that empirical research indicates that the integrative forces seem to be predominant.
Secondly, it seems theoretically that disintegration is the more attractive option. Apart from
the fact that less vertical disintegration becomes feasible for more or less equal costs, the
resulting increased competition will likely reduce the price of the products. It is clear however,
that the ultimate outcome is as yet uncertain. It may well be the case, for example, that the
reduction of internal transaction costs appears to be the most important to firms now; and that
the reduced external transaction costs will only be realized in a later stage. Perhaps the most
likely outcome is a strong horizontal integration, made possible by the reduction of internal
transaction costs, combined with a vertical disintegration, which is due to the decreased
external transaction costs, and so firms thus reap the fruits of increased competition. In this
way, the benefits of informatization may be fully exploited by organizations.
By elaborating on this scenario, we observe that the consequences may be diverse and
immense. Some examples are:
- Vertical disintegration of firms, for example by outsourcing and related concepts. Less far
reaching, but similar in kind, is the process of giving units, or departments more independence
while staying within the organization.
- The evolution of multi-location firms. This particularly relates to the spatial separation of
parts of the production process while the firm remains an entity. In this way, by choosing an
optimal location, various elements of the firm can improve their performance.
- A growth in tele-working. This may be interpreted as the ultimate form of the multi-location
firm, when each employee is seen as an independent unit of input into the firms’ production
process.
Such processes are inevitably accompanied by an increase in the number of transactions. Both
the lower per unit price of transactions and the potential gains from growing competition are
expected to more than counterbalance this effect, thus leading to an overall cost reduction for
the firm. Finally, the horizontal integration bears the danger of monopolization of the market.
Although monopolies are not by definition the “bad guys” of modem economies, (we elaborate
on that in Section 6),  public authorities have to be very alert when such monopolies arise.
The last point in this overview concerns the functioning of markets. Textbook economics
begins with the premise that agents have till and perfect information. This premise is often
criticized.  Does the current trend of informatization lead to a state where this premise is less
disputable? This is only partly so. The premise of perfect information concerns knowledge of
the supply and demand curves and the qualitative characteristics of the goods (cf the Stigler
(1961) analysis of the market for lemons). Informatization will contribute to the suitability-of
this premise, but the consequences are far reaching. In an extreme scenario, informatization
results in each product becoming unique and exactly identified by its qualitative features (cf.
the bunch of wheat example above). Each product will be demanded by one agent and supplied
by one other agent. In the very end, markets as a coordinating mechanism will disappear, but
the question remains: how do supply and demand meet?
The economic literature recognizes  four such coordinating mechanisms: direct search, brokers,
dealers and auctions (or the market)‘. Direct search implies that one supplier searches for one
demander of the good (or vice versa), while with auctions, large numbers of agents are present
at at least one side of the auction. Dealers are intermediaries who coordinate supply and
demand by using an information advantage and holding stock themselves; brokers are similar
but do not hold stock. The above mentioned process of goods becoming unique, eliminates the
necessity of auctions as an efficient coordination mechanism. Brokers are the best candidates
to replace the Walrasian auctioneers, particularly since information is their specialty. Dealers
are less likely to become the dominant coordinating mechanism since stock holding becomes
increasingly less attractive (cf. the increasing numbers of firms relying on the Just-in-Time
principle).
An interesting question is whether these newly emerging coordinating mechanisms impact on
the possibilities for achieving policy targets. Two remarks apply. Firstly, when taxes and
subsidies are used as a policy instrument, it is well known that the outcomes are in general
second-best. First-best solutions can only be reached when taxes and subsidies can be
differentiated over perfectly homogeneous groups of agents. In practice it, is impossible to
identify perfectly homogeneous groups because their number is too large, both because not
enough data is available to identify the groups and because the administrative costs would
become prohibitive. It is clear that information technology can contribute to both problems, so
that in the future,  policy measures can better approximate the theoretically first-best solutions.
Secondly, the broker offers public authorities new options for government interventions.
Walrasian auctioneers are artificial constructs, but brokers are human. These persons, or more
generally, these institutions, can be identified and used as a means to achieve policy targets.
Finally, information becoming increasingly important implies that public authorities can use this
phenomenon to achieve policy targets, simply by providing relevant information. In an
elementary form, this is current practice (anti-smoking campaigns for example), but it is
obvious that this instrument may be refined and extended in many directions. On a superficial
level, it seems that in this way, “Big Brother” is going to watch us. There is a significant
difference from Orwell’s nightmare, however. In our scenario, agents keep their Ml freedom of
choice, although governments try to influence their choice. So, there is no “Big Brother”
making your choices.
This completes our overview of the informatization process and its main consequences. In the
next sections, we study these consequences for three dedicated topics: market structures,
urban hierarchies and media usage.
‘The use of the word market  is  sometimes confusing.  Market is  used as (1) the general term for a coordinating
mechanism; (2)  in combination with the four coordinat ing mechanisms in the text  (a  dealers  market) ;  and (3)  as  a
synonym for an auction (large numbers of suppliers meet large numbers of consumers).  We try to avoid the confu-
s ion by avoiding the  term market in this part  of the paper.  In the remainder we will  use the term in i ts  general
meaning.
3. Market structures
Arguing that markets disappear by being replaced with brokers markets is clearly a sketch of a
dynamic process, rather than a state of affairs. Moreover, the extent to which this idealistic
picture will emerge moreover depends on a number of factors, particularly the number of
actors involved and the degree to which the transactions are subject to the process of
informatization. Markets will exist, but the way they work is influenced by informatization. In
this section, we ask how informatization influences market structures.
Due to the influence of Industrial Economics, the topic of market structures has gained
considerable attention lately. The central paradigm of this branch of economics is the
Structure-Conduct-Performance framework. The central thesis is that the structure of a market
determines the behavior of the actors on that market and consequently, the performance. This
performance relates to both the micro results of firms, and the meso result of markets
(efficiency), or the macro welfare theme (contribution of market outcome to societal welfare).
The question can then be asked which market structure is optimal for a given policy goal. This
is more interesting, since market structures appear to be under the direct influence of public
authorities by means of regulation, entry conditions and the like.
A market structure is characterized  by the mutual relationships between suppliers and
demanders on the market. A central theme concerns power interpreted as the ability to reach
one’s goal at the cost of others not reaching their goals. Or alternatively, the relative power of
players determines the outcome in zero-sum games. This power can be exerted in price setting
(see Ouwersloot et al. (1995) for a conceptualization  of this process), but also in the selection
of standards or other qualitative aspects.
Michael Porter has paid considerable attention to the topic of power in market relations
(Porter, 1980 and 1985). His detailed analysis basically reduces (at the danger of
oversimplifying matters) to the observation that the relative power of an agent is determined by
three factors: the number of competitors, the number of opponents (suppliers and customers)2,
and the use of information. Numbers of competitors and opponents determine the freedom of
choice of agents. The well-known extremes are the monopoly and pure competition with free
entry and exit. In a monopolized market, the monopolist has total power, in a pure competition
no single firm has real power. For other market structures, all players have at least some
freedom of choice, and they can react to each other’s decisions. Knowing these decisions or
the situations that lead to them offers the opportunity for strategic behavior. In such cases, the
follower generally is in a favorable position. Therefore, information on the actions of
competitors and opponents is of great importance in partly competitive markets. At the same
time, it is good policy for an individual firm to hide the information concerning its own
operations from the other players.
Informatization  now leads to a number of contradictory consequences for market structures.
‘In  a market ,  almost  every f irm is  both supplier  and customer.  Similarly,  each firm has to deal  with suppliers  and
customers.  From a viewpoint  of  market  organization,  and also in the context  of  power relat ions,  the roles of suppliers
and customers are more or less identical .  In our discussion we use the term ‘opponents’  to capture both sides in one
word,  which at  the same t ime underl ines the similari ty of  the relat ionships.  On the other hand, competitors of a fu-m
are those firms  that  perform comparable tasks (i .e.  make the same products) .  So competitors are importantly
different  from opponents.
First of all, the geographical scale of markets widens. This compensates for the second effect:
due to ongoing product differentiation, the per unit number of opponents decreases
importantly. Note that these effects correspond to the process of horizontal integration
predicted in Section 2. The combined effects however, lead to a greater dependence of the firm
on speciafized products and their producers/consumers. Specialization  and product
differentiation may be accompanied by the trend of product specifications that can be easily
altered (although not dramatically). This trend reintroduces the option to seek alternative
suppliers/customers. Finally, a third effect involves the speed of information transfer. This
means that concealing information about one’s own firm becomes increasingly difficult, even
when the firm’s decisions are only revealed by the actions it takes.
Before we can infer from these impacts, we observe one more important and relevant
development. This concerns the issue of confidence. Confidence relations are defined here as
long-running trading relations with the same opponent. The need for such relationships is
basically due to a lack of information. When essential pieces of information are missing a long-
run trading relationship can substitute for this lack, given the experience that previous
transactions were satisfactory. Obviously, informatization leads to a reduction in the
information gap, and thus to a reduced need for long-run trading relationships. Consequently,
such long-run relationships will diminish.
The emergence of brokers is also relevant here. Consumers will likely need to have confidence
in the brokers, so that long-running relationships with these brokers may substitute for the
confidence relations with individual suppliers. This confidence can be increased by a
certification institute. It is interesting to observe that in the Netherlands, already existing
broker markets such as housing and insurance, indeed work with a self-organized certification
mechanism. For the Internet, Wagenaar (1997) expects an increase in the number of certified
brokers for information intermediation as well.
The overall picture that emerges from the aforementioned developments is one of highly
dynamic markets in which instability prevails. The more general principle of increasing power
further  supports the expected development of disintegration of firms. Also, within smaller
firms, hiding the relevant information is much easier.
From a welfare-economic point of view, there is a limit to the acceptable level of power of
individual agents. This is an obvious task for public authorities. The issue of certification
should also be responsibility of these authorities, which would be in the interest of the markets
themselves. An interesting option in this respect is public approval of private certification
institutes. One way or the other, consumers will, in the end, only fully trust certificates from an
independent organization. Apart from these remarks, it appears that the role for public
authorities is quite limited. The trend is actually towards a (purely) competitive market, in
which there is no specific role for government. Agents will attempt to gain as much control as
possible in this market, and that is governments only concern.
Finally, we observe that the developments described above also affect the important issue of
location decisions. The choice of a location is determined by considering a multitude of factors.
We expect that informatization influences the relative weights attributed to these factors.
Specifically, the importance of factors such as proximity of suppliers and customers will
deteriorate due to informatization. Other factors less influenced by this process will gain in
weight, such as the physical infrastructure or taxing regimes. In the next section, we discuss
the consequences of these developments for urban networks.
4. Urban networks
Urban networks play an important conceptual role in numerous issues in administration,
economics, transport, etc. An urban network may be defined as the structure of mutual
relationships between cities in a certain area. The mutual relationships are described in
population rankings, distance between cities, and the implicit dependencies of smaller cities
upon larger ones. In this section, we briefly discuss the economic-theoretical background of
urban networks, its empirical relevance, the impact of informatization on the elements of this
background, and the likely consequences for urban networks, particularly in relation to
economics and transport.
The need for safety is usually regarded as the single most important reason for the emergence
of cities in ancient history. Nevertheless, economic arguments are also put forth to explain the
emergence - and especially the success - of the human invention of the city. There are two such
arguments (e.g. Segal, 1977). The first is that a city - a concentration of people and human
activity - provides a critical mass of labor supply and purchasing power required for the
evolution of economic activity. Secondly, transport between locations can be more efficient
when the infrastructure is used by many agents - a matter of economies of scale. Hence, the
bundling of transport between cities, made possible by a bundling of activities within these
cities, facilitates the efficient use of infrastructure. The existence of an infrastructure in turn
gives the cities an edge when it comes to subsequent location decisions. In this way, cities
confirm their own success, thus explaining the never-ending growth of cities.
With these notions in mind Christaller and Losch developed the so-called centralplace theory
in the 1930s and 1940s. It plays an important role even in contemporary research into urban
networks. An important conclusion of this theory is that urban networks show a hierarchical
pattern whereby the largest city offers the supply of all products and services; the next largest
cities offer a few less; the third largest cities offer again a few services less, etc. Implicitly, this
theory describes the dependence of the smaller cities on the larger ones, since some services
are only supplied on a higher hierarchical level. Moreover, each city on the n-th hierarchical
level will seek its missing services in the city of the (n-l)-st  level, nearest by, due to the
minimization of transportation costs. Finally, the hierarchy will be determined by the size of the
populations because of the critical mass argument.
Although the direct empirical relevance of the centraZpZuce theory is limited, it has made an
important contribution to understanding urban hierarchies and the associated inter-urban
dependencies. For example, the Dutch urban network is far from the idealist Christaller-Losch
type of network. Nevertheless, notions that can be traced back to centraZpZace  theory can still
be found in contemporary Dutch urban policy.
Considering the effects of informatization, we first have to recognize  that economic arguments
are not the only ones that hold in the analysis of urban networks. We already noted that in the
very old days the sociological argument of safety was of great(er)  importance, and nowadays
in the Netherlands, political arguments seem to be the primary driving force for urban
developments.
But given these asides we can see a clear effect of informatization on the economic arguments
underlying the structure of urban networks. First, the importance of proximity to input
(particularly knowledge) reduces strongly. This holds for both information as a product, as
well as the information component of other goods. The bundling argument still has its
relevance as long as the transport of information requires fixed networks. The growing
importance of wireless communication, however, which will eventually include a dominant
position for this type of telecommunication, further reduces the need and logic of bundling of
transport of information. In the most extreme scenario, the economic arguments will become
entirely redundant. The essential point is that location decisions will no longer be made on the
basis of these traditional economic arguments. It will no longer be possible to describe location
patterns in terms of urban hierarchies. The resulting physical transport of tangible products will
show a highly Ass-cross character. Consequently, the urban network will be less hierarchical,
but more grounded upon a basis of economic equity (Stough, 1995). In other words, economic
centers will disappear.
Clearly, the above describes an idealistic and extreme scenario. An implicit assumption in this
scenario is that informatization is a ubiquitous process: all regions and all people profit equally
from the informatization process. Gillespie and Cornford  (1995) argued that such a scenario
currently has limited empirical validity. The developments instead point to a fragmented
scenario, in which the undirected and unguided development of the informatization process
leads to strategic behavior. The result is that informatization is concentrated in cities.
Therefore, Gillespie and Comford advocate the regulation of this process so that it will not
lead to “...  a sharp differentiation between places in the range and quality of services
provided”.
Finally, we repeat that this analysis is strongly biased towards economics. Other, perhaps more
relevant approaches of urban networks can be thought of We strongly advocate such
“alternative” analyses to see the differences and the similarities, and to learn more about urban
networks (examples of alternative analyses are: Castells  (1989) and Graham and Marvin,
1996). Multidisciplinarity is the key to understanding the issues in this highly policy relevant
subject.
5. Search and media use
We have identified two consequences of the process of informatization that lead to questions
concerning search processes. First, the increased spatial scale of markets, in combination with
the fewer per square kilometer number of transaction partners raises the question: how do
these partners come to know each other. Secondly, diminishing importance of confidence
relations and long-running trading relationships can only become reality when an agent can find
new partners relatively easily (i.e. for small cost). This concerns the efficiency of the search
process.
The search process can be loosely defined as the process that matches demand and supply. In
Section 2 we concluded that the most likely future structure of this process can be identified as
a brokers market. In this section, we concentrate on the instruments used to realize the goal of
search: to find a transaction partner. We specifically study the topic of media choice. Our
analysis will remain on a general level; the pretension to provide answers for concrete media
choice problems will be absent.
Our central question is: how do a producer and consumer of a certain product X, with a
specified set of product characteristics meet. The most elementary requirement for meeting is
that at least one of these agents sends a message. Such a message will be undirected, single to
multi-point, because a large part of the population will have to notice the message. A sender
hopes that one of the recipients is a desired transaction partner.
Of course, there are factors that influence the success rate of such undirected message. Firstly,
the accuracy of the message (does it describe exactly what I want to tell?) plays a significant
role. Secondly, media choice is of utmost importance. The population that is reached is in the
first place determined by the chosen medium.
The first impact of informatization is that much more data has to be included in the message.
Product differentiation is asking this. Nowadays, we do not buy apples, but we buy Golden
Delicious from France, not syringed and transported by train. However, a consumer who wants
Dutch apples only, does not need to know whether French apples are syringed. Hence,
information can be presented in a filtered way. This may lead to a hierarchical search process,
an expectation that again is in line with the prediction of the dominance of broker markets.
Such hierarchical search processes can already be observed today. A relatively new
phenomenon however, is that this hierarchical search covers multiple media. For example, the
interested reader of a newspaper ad is quite frequently referred to a home page on the Internet
for further  information.
This brings us to our final point in this section: the role of the Internet. It is clear that the
Internet will play an important role in all kinds of human communication in the future,
including economic search processes. It is impossible to predict, however, in what direction
and to what extent the Internet will become important. A number of questions arise in this
respect:
l how will the adoption of computers evolve over time, and moreover which share will be
connected to computer networks;
. how will the price mechanism look and will consumers have enough confidence in the
reliability of the network with regards to financial transactions;
l how will other media adopt strategic behavior and how will the future equilibrium look;
l will hierarchical search be the dominant paradigm and to what extent, and will it indeed
include multiple media or will it be restricted to a single medium.
Concerning these issues, public authorities seem to have adopted a position of wait-and-see
what market developments will bring. When public authorities only had an efficient market as
their policy goal, this attitude would have been completely justified. A market-driven
development may be expected as the most efficient outcome. However, for governments, other
motives may be equally important. There are two particular motives to watch closely during
the course of events and to react upon when necessary. First, is the familiar possibility of
monopolization of markets. Efficient outcomes of market processes are only guaranteed when
sufficient competition exists, and this may justify government intervention. A second motive
can be that certain media serve two important goals. The free press that is represented in
journals and newspapers has a particularly important role in the political process of
democracies. Hence, a certain degree of media protection against pure economic threats can be
justified.
In the next section, we discuss in more detail governments’ involvement in the process of
infortnatization and its derivatived effects.
6. Informatization and Regulation
Government’s involvement in inforrnatization is bi-directional. First, the possibilities and
necessities of regulation are discussed in Section 6.1, Next, the impacts and consequences of
informatization for policy instruments are analyzed in Section 6.2.
6. I Regulating the information era
Concerning the desirability of government intervention in the process of inforrnatization, it has
to be noted that:
l informatization may lead to a significant improvement in the efficiency of economic
processes, because of the combination of tangible goods and their intangible information
aspects;
l informatization may lead to a continuing specification of goods and services, inducing a
shift from markets to transactions;
l informatization will lead to better knowledge concerning goods and services, although too
much information bears the danger of a decrease in the efficiency of the decision-making
process. The reason for this is that the supply of too much information itself leads to a
decision making process, viz. which information to collect and exploit to make the original
decision;
l information can be so valuable that issues concerning the protection of property rights,
privacy and the individual may raise difficult questions, that could delay the process of
informatization;
. informatization generally assumes a network infrastructure for which issues related to
natural monopolies, free entrance, accessibility, contestable markets and separation of
ownership and usage are highly relevant.
All this suggests that many informatization-related topics may be left to “the market” as a co-
ordination mechanism, but that topics related to market failure require a certain level of
government involvement.
For the EC, an important first step towards the liberalisation of the telecommunication market
was made by the publication of the “Green Paper” on ‘The Development of the Common
Market for Telecommunication Services and Equipment’ in 1987. In this document, the
principles of liberalisation were explicated, but a plea for standardization and harmonization of
regulation in the member states was also held.
Informatization in general presupposes the existence, connectivity and entrance to an
information network. Many of these networks are public, although they are often exploited by
semi-public agents. OECD (1995) gives an interesting overview. An increasing number of
networks however, are privately owned. The market has apparently succeeded in organising
private networks, not only for intra-firm application, but also for inter-firm objectives
(Eliasson, 199 1).
In the World Bank Development Report of 1994, it is argued that government’s objectives in
infrastructure development should be directed toward achieving growth and sustainability in a
market-oriented environment. Policy should give incentives to treat “networks” as a
commercial activity, not as a bureaucracy. Consequently, monopolies have to be fought, and
competition has to be favored, in particular by distinguishing between ownership and use of
networks. This opens the door to public-private partnerships in various forms, not only for
financing, but also for regulation and licensing (cf. the role of FCC and Oftel). Hence, even in a
highly deregulated economy, there is enough room for informatization policy, which may have
as its primary objectives the guarantee of a desired level of competition, as well as the
standardization and elimination of bottle necks.
Another EC “Green Paper” on ‘Commercial Communications in the Internal Market’ published
in 1996 shows similar conclusions. Market-based communication and information services
grow at high rates. Unnecessary and uncoordinated regulation creates numerous barriers to
successful commercial activities in this area. This again necessitates standardization and
harmonization to fully profit from the emerging information era.
6.2 The impact of informatization on policy
For a fundamental discussion of the impact of informatization on policy, we first reconsider
three basic questions: what is the motivation of policy intervention, what are policy objectives,
and what instruments are used?
Basically, a government intervenes in an economy when it becomes clear that without this
intervention, certain issues would not go well for example, certain goods would not be
produced or a framework for transactions between people would not exist. Government
intervention is therefore a way to maximize welfare, which implicitly is defined as the general
government objective. Yet, besides this economic objective, other objectives will be pursued in
other fields (social, military, law). These various objectives will often be at odds. Therefore, a
further  task for governments is to make decisions where partial objectives are conflicting.
In Western societies, it is generally believed that the economic objective can best be achieved
by free competition in markets and that intervention is necessary only when markets fail. From
an economic point of view, we have found three intrinsic reasons for market intervention:
market failure, the conflict between economic and other objectives, and the construction and
maintenance of a legal framework as a prerequisite to transactions. Market failure can be
further broken down into three prominent problems (Fokkema and Nijkamp, 1994)
l imperfect competition, caused by a cost structure that leads to (natural) monopolies. Berg
and Tschirhart (1989) wrote an interesting volume on the regulation of monopolies;
l imperfect information;
l absence of markets, as for example, in the case of externalities and public goods.
The objective of efficiency has been, and will most likely be the central policy objective in the
economic domain. Policy that is based on this objective is contingent to external factors of
which three need to be discussed here. Firstly, the relative weight that objectives in different
domains receive changes over time. This reflects the variety in voter preferences. Secondly,
technological progress is important. Policy targets that were technically~impossible  one day,
become feasible now. Road pricing is a good example in this case. Thirdly, and relatively
recently,it is recognized  within economics that even efficiency is a multidimensional attribute.
Nowadays, a distinction is made between static efficiency (maximal production for minimal.
cost) and dynamic efficiency, which involves the development of new products and production
processes (innovation) at a welfare maximizing rate (see e.g. Scherer and Ross, 1990).
Having laid bare the tindamental  reasons for government intervention and the issues
influencing it, we are now ready to discuss the impact of informatization on the role of public
authorities.
The first point concerns the fact that objectives in frequently conflicting areas have to be traded
off in the formulation of policy. The mere necessity of trade-off will not be influenced by the
informatization process. In an indirect way informatization, may very well impact this point.
Firstly, an unequal development of informatization in various areas, or among different groups
of people may have an impact on many other issues. For example, the “electronic democracy”
may be a very efficient and promising additional option for politics. However, only persons
with network access can participate in this “democracy”, and hence from a procedural, equity
and legal perspective, this idea cannot yet be further developed. Secondly, to guarantee equal
access to the merits of the information age, governments may decide that a common standard
for the development of software is mandatory, while this standard is at the same time included
in basic education programmes. This is in direct conflict with the economic goal of efficiency,
which would require the development of software in a free and competitive market.
Next, we consider the possible impact of informatization on the three identified reasons for
market failure. First, a natural monopoly arises when the sectoral cost structure can be
characterized as sub-additive3.  Non-natural monopolies are often enforced by artificial barriers
to entry. Again refer to Berg and Tschirhart (1989) for a comprehensive overview.
Transaction costs are an important source of economies of scale. Since informatization reduces
these transaction costs, as we discussed above, this reduces the likelihood of monopolies being
natural. Disintegration also leads to smaller - single product - firms which are usually
characterized by linear cost functions, so are not sub-additive.
Such small firms will however, try to protect their vulnerable position due to limited market
power, by creating artificial barriers, for example by standardization or non-public agreements.
Once again, informatization will undermine this possibility because it is increasingly difficult to
conceal information.
Secondly, it is clear that the point of incomplete information is largely overcome in the
information era, as we already discussed in Section 2. There we concluded that the numbers of
suppliers and demanders of products become significantly less, and diffise in space. This
would lead to a growing importance of brokerage as a market mechanism. In such broker
markets, imperfect information is not a very likely source of market failure. However, the
monopolization of the available information and the issue of confidence remain as important
concerns.
The third source of market failure was the absence of markets related to the issues of
externalities, public goods, etc. The most important sources for externalities are ill-defined
property rights (who owns the clean air in a building, the smoker or the non-smoker), non-
rivalry in consumption, indivisibility of consumption and the impossibility of technical exclusion
3Sub-additivity  of the cost tknction  implies that the production of an amount x of a product is less costly than the
sum of producing y and z of  this  product ,  with ytz=x,  for all  x,  y and z. Economies of  scale are the most  important
reason for sub-addit ivi ty,  and for single product  firms  the two concepts are identical .  However,  sub-addit ivity is
usually also defined for multi-product fums in which case other causes may also play a role.
in consumption. In general, we remark that informatization and information technology can
help solve many of these issues; but on the other hand, some problems are fundamental, and
are not a matter of information, such as the issue of property rights. Therefore, government
intervention will be persistently necessary, although the number of instances in which policy is
required will reduce. The most important point remaining will be to create the conditions under
which the “right of information” will be guaranteed equally for all agents.
7. Conclusions
Informatization is a complex process which touches upon the fundamental properties of
economic processes. Many basic and even elementary questions remain unsolved for the
moment. Nevertheless, some general and consequential developments have been identified.
These can be summarised as follows: Informatization leads to an increasingly chaotic economy,
with more products, less stability and involving a widening spatial area. At the same time, the
self-regulating power of the economy increases. Consequently both the possibility and the
necessity of government intervention diminish.
Yet some basic task for public authorities remains. Particularly in the case of fundamental
market failure which is closely related to the absence of property rights, is government
involvement required.
In this paper we addressed the consequences of the informatization process on some dedicated
areas, including market structures, urban networks and the new media. The general conclusion
is that these particular areas are strongly influenced by the process of informatization such that
a significant share of the existing scientific knowledge loses its relevance. Therefore, it is
recommended, from a policy perspective as well, to formulate a broad, integrated and
especially multi-disciplinary research agenda into the impacts of the process of informatization.
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